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Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These
games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in
mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may in fact take place between a number of
individuals and not just between two. Here, we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as
we have only two strategies, many results from two player games can be generalized to multiple players.
For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for
pairwise interactions do no longer hold. For two player games with any number of strategies there can be
at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players d with any number of strategies n,
there can be at most (d− 1)n−1 isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical
complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and
can easily be applied for specific cases, e.g. public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.
Game theory was developed in economics to describe so-
cial interactions, but it took the genius of John Maynard
Smith and George Price to transfer this idea to biology and
develop Evolutionary Game Theory [1–3]. Numerous books
and articles have been written since. Typically, they begin
with an introduction about evolutionary game theory and
go on to describe the Prisoners Dilemma, which is one of
the most intriguing games because rational individual deci-
sions lead to a deviation from the social optimum. In an
evolutionary setting, the average welfare of the population
decreases, since defection is selected over cooperation. How
can a strategy spread that decreases the fitness of an actor,
but increases the fitness of its interaction partner? Vari-
ous ways to solve such social dilemmas have been proposed
[4, 5]. In the multiplayer version of the Prisoners Dilemma,
the Public Goods Game, a number of players take part by
contributing into a common pot. Interest is added to it and
then the amount is split equally amongst all, regardless of
whether they have contributed or not. Since only a fraction
of one’s own investment goes back to each player, there is no
incentive to deposit anything. Instead, it is tempting only to
take the profits of the investments of others. This scenario
has been analyzed in a variety of contexts [6, 7]. The evo-
lutionary dynamics of more general multiplayer games has
received considerably less attention and we can guess why
from the way Hamilton put it, “The theory of many-person
games may seem to stand to that of two-person games in
the relation of sea-sickness to a headache” [8]. Only re-
cently, this topic has attracted renewed interest [9–14].
As shown by Broom et al. [9], the most general form of
multiplayer games, a straightforward generalization of the
payoff matrix concept, leads to a significant increase in the
complexity of the evolutionary dynamics. While the evolu-
tion of cooperation is an important and illustrative example,
typically it does not lead to very complex dynamics. On the
other hand, intuitive explanations for more general games
are less straightforward, but only they illustrate the full dy-
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namical complexity of multiplayer games [9].
To approach this complexity, we discuss evolutionary dy-
namics in finite as well as infinite populations. For finite
populations, we base our analysis on a variant of the Moran
process [15], but under weak selection, our approach is valid
for a much wider range of evolutionary processes, see next
section. We begin by recalling the well studied two player
two strategies scenario. Then, we increase the number of
players which results in a change in the dynamics and some
basic properties of the games. For infinitely large popula-
tions, we explore the dynamics of multiplayer games with
multiple strategies and illustrate that this new domain is
very different as compared to the two player situation (see
also [9]). We provide some general results for these mul-
tiplayer games with multiple strategies. The two strategy
case and the two player scenario are then a special case, a
small part of a bigger and more complex multiverse.
I. MODEL AND RESULTS
Two player games with two strategies have been studied
in detail, under different dynamics and for infinite as well
as for finite population sizes. Typically, two players meet,
interact and obtain a payoff. The payoff is then the basis for
their reproductive success and hence for the change in the
composition of the population [2]. This framework can be
used for biological systems, where strategies spread by ge-
netic reproduction, and for social systems, where strategies
spread by cultural imitation.
Consider two strategies, A and B. We define the payoffs
by αi where α is the strategy of the focal individual and the
subscript i is the number of remaining players playing A.
For example, when an A strategist meets another person
playing A she gets a1. She gets a0 when she meets a B
strategist. This leads to the payoff matrix
A B
A a1 a0
B b1 b0
(1)
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2Some of the important properties of two player games are:
(1) Internal equilibria. When A is the best reply to B
(a0 > b0) and B is the best reply to A (b1 > a1),
the replicator dynamics predicts a stable coexistence
of both strategies. Similarly, when both strategies are
best replies to themselves, there is an unstable co-
existence equilibrium. A two player game with two
strategies can have at most one such internal equilib-
rium.
(2) Comparison of strategies. In a finite population, strat-
egy A will replace B with a higher probability than
vice versa if Na0 + (N − 2)a1 > (N − 2)b0 + Nb1.
This result holds for the deterministic evolutionary dy-
namics discussed by Kandori et al. [16], for the Moran
process and a wide range of related birth death pro-
cesses under weak selection [15, 17] and for some
special processes for any intensity of selection [17].
However, Fudenberg et al. [18] obtain a slightly dif-
ferent result for an alternative variant of the Moran
process under non-weak selection. For large popula-
tions, the condition above reduces to risk dominance
of A, a1 + a0 > b1 + b0.
(3) Comparison to neutrality. For weak selection, the fix-
ation probability of strategy A in a finite population is
larger than neutral (1/N) if (2N−1)a0+(N−2)a1 >
(2N − 4)b0 + (N + 1)b1. For a large N , this means
that A has a higher fitness than B at frequency 1/3,
termed as the one-third law [19–21]. The 1/3-law
holds under weak selection for any process within the
domain of Kingman’s coalescence [22].
Often, interactions are not between two players, but be-
tween whole groups of players. Quorum sensing, public
transportation systems or climate preservation represent ex-
amples for systems in which large groups of agents interact
simultaneously. Starting with the seminal work of Gordon
and Hardin on the tragedy of the commons [23, 24], such
multiplayer games have been analyzed in the context of the
evolution of cooperation [25–28], but general multiplayer in-
teractions have received less attention, see however [9–13].
We again assume there to be two strategies A and B.
We can also maintain the same definition of the payoffs as
αi. As there are d− 1 other individuals, excluding the focal
player, i can range from 0 to d − 1. We can depict the
payoffs αi in the form
Opposing A players d− 1 d− 2 . . . k . . . 0
A ad−1 ad−2 . . . ak . . . a0
B bd−1 bd−2 . . . bk . . . b0
(2)
However, for multiplayer games an additional complication
arises. Consider a three player game (d = 3). Let the focal
player be playing A. As d = 3 there are d − 1 = 2 other
players. If one of them is of type A and the other one of type
A
A B C
B
C
A
B
3 x 3
2 x 2
2 x 2 x 2
FIG. 1: For 2 × 2 games, the payoff matrix has 4 entries.
If we increase the number of strategies, the payoff matrix
grows in size. For example, the payoff matrix of a 3 × 3
game has 9 entries. If we increase the number of players, the
payoff matrix becomes higher dimensional. For example, two
strategy games with three players are described by 2 × 2 × 2
payoff structures with 8 entries. In general, a d player game
with n strategies is decribed by nd payoff values.
B, there can be the combinations AAB or ABA. Do these
two structures give the same payoffs? Or, in a more gen-
eral sense, does the order of players matter? If order does
matter, the payoffs are in a d-dimensional discrete space as
illustrated by Fig. 1.
There are numerous examples where the order of the play-
ers is very important. In a game of soccer, it is necessary
to have a player specialized as the goal keeper in the team.
But it is also important that the goal keeper is at the goal
and not acting as a centre-forward. A biological example
has been studied by Stander in the Etosha National Park
[29]. The lionesses hunt in packs and employ the flush and
ambush technique. Some lie in ambush while others flush
out the prey from the flanks and drive them towards the
ones waiting in ambush. This technique needs more than
two players to be successful. Some lionesses always display
a particular position to be a preferred one (right flank, left
flank or ambush). The success rate is higher if the lionesses
are in their preferred positions. Thus, the ordering of players
matters here.
To address situations in which the order of player matters,
we have to make use of a tensor notation for writing down
the payoffs which offers the flexibility to include higher di-
mensions of the payoff matrix. Consider a tensor β with d
indices defined as follows βi0,i1,i2,i3,....id−1 , where the first
index denotes the focal player’s strategy. Each of the in-
dices represents the strategy of the player in the position
denoted by its subscript. The index i can represent any of
the n strategies. Thus the total number of entries will be
3nd. This structure is the multiplayer equivalent to a payoff
matrix, see [9] and Fig. 1. Consider for example a game
with three players and two strategies (A and B). If the
order of players matters, then the payoff values for strategy
A are represented by βAAA, βAAB , βABA and βABB . This
increase in complexity is handled by the tensor notation but
not reflected in the tabular notation Eq. (2). But as long
as interaction groups are formed at random, we can trans-
form the payoffs such that they can be written in the form
of Eq. (2), see Supporting Text. In this case, the payoffs
are weighted by their occurrence to calculate the average
payoffs. For example in our three player games, a1 has to
be counted twice (corresponding to βAAB and βABA). If
we would consider evolutionary games in structured popu-
lations instead of random interaction group formation, then
the argument breaks down and the tensor notation cannot
be reduced.
In case of d player games with two strategies we can then
write the average payoff piA obtained by strategy A in an
infinite population as piA =
∑d−1
k=0
(
d−1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−kak,
where x is the fraction of A players. An equivalent equa-
tion holds for the average payoff piB of strategy B. The
replicator equation of a 2-player game is given by [30]
x˙ = x(1− x)(piA − piB). (3)
Obviously, there are two trivial fixed points when the whole
population consists of A (x = 1) or of B (x = 0). In
d player games, both piA and piB can be polynomials of
maximum degree d − 1, see Supporting Text. This implies
that the replicator equation can have up to d − 1 interior
fixed points. In the two strategy case, these points can be
either stable or unstable. The maximum number of stable
interior fixed points possible are d/2 for even d and (d−1)/2
for odd d, see also [10] or [9], where it is shown that all
these scenarios are also attainable. For d = 2, piA and piB
are polynomials of degree 1, hence there can be at most one
internal equilibrium, which is either unstable (coordination
games) or stable (coexistence games). For d = 3, there
can also be a second interior fixed point. If one of them is
stable, the other one must be unstable. This can lead to a
situation in which A is advantageous when rare (the trivial
fixed point x = 0 is unstable), becomes disadvantageous at
intermediate frequencies, but advantageous again for high
frequencies, as in multiplayer stag hunts [11].
For a d player game to have d − 1 interior fixed points,
the quantities ak − bk and ak+1− bk+1 must have different
signs for all k. However, this condition is necessary (because
the direction of selection can only change d− 1 times if the
payoff difference ak − bk changes sign d − 1 times), but
not sufficient, see Supporting Text. Pacheco et al. have
studied public goods games in which a threshold frequency
of cooperators is necessary for producing any public good
[11, 12]. The payoff difference changes sign twice at this
threshold value and hence there can be at most two internal
equilibria.
A d player game has a single internal equilibrium if ak−bk
has a different sign than ak+1 − bk+1 for a single value
of k: In this case, A individuals are disadvantageous at
low frequency and advantageous at high frequency (or vice
versa). If ak−bk changes sign only once, then the direction
of selection can change at most once. Thus, this condition
is sufficient in infinite populations.
Now we deviate from the replicator dynamics, where the
average payoff of a strategy is equated to reproductive fit-
ness, and turn our attention to finite populations. In this
case, the sampling for piA and piB is no longer binomial,
but hypergeometric, see Supporting Text. In finite popu-
lations, the intensity of selection measures how important
the payoff from the game is for the reproductive fitness.
We take fitness as an exponential function of the payoff,
fA = exp(+wpiA) for A players and fB = exp(+wpiB) for
B players [31]. If w  1, selection is strong and the average
payoffs dictate the outcome of the game, whereas if w  1
then selection is weak and the payoffs have only marginal ef-
fect on the game. This choice of fitness recovers the results
of the usual Moran process introduced by Nowak et al. [15]
and simplifies the analytical calculations significantly under
strong selection [31]. However, for non-weak selection other
payoff to fitness mappings lead to slightly different results
[18]. We employ the Moran process to model the game,
but our results hold for any birth-death process in which
the ratio of transition probabilities can be approximated un-
der weak selection by a term linear in the payoff difference
in addition to the neutral result. In the Moran process, an
individual is selected for reproduction at random, but pro-
portional to its fitness. The individual produces identical
offspring. Another individual is chosen at random for death.
With this approach we can address the basic properties of d
player games with 2 strategies generalizing quantities from
2× 2 games.
Does A replace B with a higher probability than vice
versa? Comparing the fixation probabilities of a single A or
B individual, ρA and ρB , we find that ρA > ρB is equivalent
to
d−1∑
k=0
(Nak − ad−1) >
d−1∑
k=0
(Nbk − b0), (4)
see Supporting Text. For d = 2, we recover the risk dom-
inance from above. For large N , the condition reduces to
[13]
d−1∑
k=0
ak >
d−1∑
k=0
bk. (5)
These two conditions are valid for any intensity of selection
in our variant of the Moran process.
The one third law for 2-player games is not valid for higher
number of players, see Supporting Text. Instead, the condi-
tion we obtain for the payoff entries is not directly related to
the internal equilibrium points (as opposed to the two player
case, which makes the one third law special). For weak se-
lection, we show in the Supporting text that ρA > 1/N is
4equivalent to
d−1∑
k=0
[N(d−k)− k − 1] ak >
d−1∑
k=0
[(N + 1)(d−k)bk − (d+ 1)b0] .
(6)
For large population size this reduces to [13]
d−1∑
k=0
(d− k)ak >
d−1∑
k=0
(d− k)bk, (7)
which is the one-third law from above for d = 2. Inequality
(7) means that the initial phase of invasion is of most im-
portance: The factor d−k decreases linearly with k and the
payoff values with small indices k are more important than
the payoff values with larger indices. Thus, the payoffs rel-
evant for small mutant frequencies determine whether the
condition is fulfilled. In other words, the initial invasion is
crucial to obtain a fixation probability larger than 1/N .
In general, the conditions (5) and (7) are independent
of each other. When Eq. (5) is satisfied and Eq. (7) is
not satisfied then both fixation probabilities are less than
neutral (1/N). But when Eq. (5) is not satisfied and Eq.
(7) is satisfied then both ρA and ρB are larger than neutral
(1/N). This scenario is impossible for two player games.
Let us now turn to multiplayer games with multiple strate-
gies. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the payoff matrix of a two
player game increases in size when more strategies are
added. If more players are added, the dimensionality in-
creases. Now we address the evolutionary dynamics of such
games. Again we assume that interaction groups are formed
at random, such that only the number of players with a
certain strategy – but not their arrangement – matters.
The replicator dynamics of a d player game with n possible
strategies can be written as a system of n − 1 differential
equations:
x˙j = xj(pij − 〈pi〉) (8)
where xj is the frequency of strategy j, pij is the fitness
of the strategy j and 〈pi〉 = ∑nj=1 xjpij is the average fit-
ness. The evolution of this system can be studied on a
simplex with n vertices, Sn. The simplex Sn is defined by
the set of all the frequencies which follow the normalisation∑n
j=1 xj = 1. The fixed points of this system are given
by the combination of frequencies of the strategies which
satisfy, pi1 = · · · = pin. The vertices of the simplex where
xj is either equal to 1 or 0 are trivial fixed points. In addi-
tion, there can be e.g. fixed points on the edges or the faces
of the simplex. We speak of fixed points in the interior of
the simplex when all payoffs are identical at a point where
all frequencies are nonzero, xj > 0 for all j. The internal
equilibria are of special interest, because they may represent
points of stable biodiversity. For example, three strains of
Escherichia coli competing for resources have been stud-
ied [32, 33]. K is a killer strain which produces a toxin
harmful to S, R does not produce toxin, but is resistant to
the toxin of K. The sensitive strain S is affected by the
Stable
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SlowFast
FIG. 2: Evolutionary dynamics in a simplex with the max-
imum number of internal equilibria for d = 4 players and
n = 3 strategies as given by (d − 1)n−1 = 9. On the dotted
cubic curve, we have pi1 = pi3. On the full cubic curve, we
have pi2 = pi3. When both lines intersect in the interior of the
simplex, we have an internal equilibrium.
toxin of K. These three strains are engaged in a kind of
rock-paper-scissors game. K kills S. S reproduces faster
than R, not paying the cost for resistance. R is superior
to K being immune to its toxin. The precise nature of in-
teractions determines whether biodiversity is maintained in
an unstructured population [30, 34]. In our context this is
reflected by the existence of an isolated internal fixed point.
Here, we ask the more general question whether there
are internal equilibria in d player games with n strategies.
If so, then how many internal equilibria are possible? It has
been shown that for a two player game with any number of
strategies n there can be at most one isolated internal equi-
librium [30, 35]. In the Supporting Text, we demonstrate
that the maximum number of internal equilibria in d players
with n strategies is
(d− 1)n−1. (9)
The maximum possible number of internal equilibria in-
creases as a polynomial in the number of players, but expo-
nentially in the number of strategies. For example for d = 4
and n = 3 the maximum number of internal equilibria is 9,
see Fig. 2.
Note that for d = 2 we recover the well known unique
equilibrium. For n = 2, we recover the maximum of d−1 in-
ternal equilibria, see above. Of course, not all of these equi-
libria are stable. Broom et al. have shown which patterns of
stability are attainable for general 3-player 3-strategy games
[9].
This illustrates that many different states of biodiversity
are possible in multiplayer games, whereas in two player
games, only a single one is possible. This is a crucial point
5 < 0.01
0.09
 0.04
 < 0.01
0.19
< 0.02
0.37
0.39
0.75
0.25 0.50
 0.50 0.87 0.94
0.13 0.06
3
d
4
4 n52 3
2
None
One
Two
Three
Four and above
Number of internal equilibria
 0.22
 0.28
 0.48
0.54
0.36
 0.36
 0.50
 0.14
FIG. 3: The probabilities of observing the different number
of internal equilibria, 0 to (d− 1)n−1 as the system gets more
complex in the number of strategies n and the number of play-
ers d. Random games are generated by choosing the payoff
entries ak, bk, . . . from a uniform distribution. If we consider
that the order does matter and generate the random games
based on the entries of a payoff structure with nd entries, then
the probability of observing a particular number of equilibria
is only slightly lower (averages over 108 different games with
uniformly chosen payoff entries ak, bk, . . .).
when one attempts to address the question of biodiversity
with evolutionary game theory. In the previous example the
studies dealing with E. coli consider the system as a d = 2
player game with three strategies. Do we really know that
d = 2? If strains are to be engineered to stably coexist, then
multiple interactions (d > 2) would open up the possibility
of multiple internal fixed points instead of the single one for
d = 2.
If we choose a game at random, what is the probability
that the game has a certain number of internal equilibria?
To this end, we take the following approach: We generate
many random payoff structures in which all payoff entries are
uniformly distributed random numbers [36]. For each payoff
structure, we compute the number of internal equilibria. It
turns out that games with many internal equilibria are the
exception rather than the rule. For example, the probability
to see 2 or more internal equilibria in a game with 4 players
and 3 strategies is ≈ 24%. The probability that a randomly
chosen game has the maximum possible number of equilibria
decreases with increasing number of players and number of
strategies, see Fig. 3.
Also the probability of having a single equilibrium reduces.
Instead we obtain several internal equilibria in the case of
more than two players. For two player games, the proba-
bility to see an internal equilibrium at all decreases roughly
exponentially with the number of strategies. This poses an
additional difficulty in coordinating in multiplayer games,
because several different solutions may be possible that look
quit similar at first sight.
II. DISCUSSION
Multiplayer games with multiple strategies is what we
find all around. We interact with innumerable people at
the same time, directly or indirectly. Some interactions
may be pairwise, but others are not. In real life, we may
typically be engaged in many person games instead of a
disjoined collection of two person games [8]. The evolu-
tion and maintenance of cooperation, problems pertaining
from group hunting to deteriorating climate, all are fields
for a multiple number of players [28, 29, 37, 38]. They can
have different interests and hence use different strategies.
There are other cases like the maintenance of biodiversity
where multiplayer interactions may lead to a much richer
spectrum for biodiversity than the commonly analyzed two
player interactions. The presence of multiple stable states
also contributes to the intricate dynamics observed in main-
tenance of biodiversity [39]. Multiplayer games may help to
improve our understanding of such systems. The problem
of handling multiple equilibria is not just limited to biologi-
cal games but it also appears in economics [40, 41]. Many
insights can be obtained by studying two player games, but
it blurs the complexity of multiplayer interactions. Here, we
have derived some basic rules which apply to multiplayer
games with two strategies for finite as well as infinite pop-
ulations and discussed the number of internal equilibria in
d player game with n strategies, which determine how the
dynamics proceeds.
This theory can be applied to all kinds of games with
any number of players and strategies and can thus be easily
applied to public goods games, multiplayer stag hunts or
multiplayer snowdrift games. We believe that this opens
up new avenues where we can get analytical description
of situations which are thought to be very complex and
further discussions on these issues will prove to be fruitful
due to the intrinsic importance of multiplayer interactions.
We conclude this approach by quoting Hamilton again, “A
healthy society should feel sea-sick when confronted with
the endless internal instabilities of the ‘solutions’, ‘coalition
sets’, etc., which the theory of many-person games has had
to describe.” [8].
Acknowledgments
We thank the anonymous referees for their helpful com-
ments. C.S.G. and A.T. acknowledge support by the Emmy-
Noether program of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
and the DAAD (project 0813008).
[1] Maynard Smith, J, Price, GR (1973) The logic of animal
conflict. Nature 246:15–18.
[2] Maynard Smith, J (1982) Evolution and the Theory of
6Games (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[3] Nowak, MA (2006) Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, MA).
[4] Nowak, MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooper-
ation. Science 314:1560–1563.
[5] Taylor, C, Nowak, MA (2007) Transforming the dilemma.
Evolution 61:2281–2292.
[6] Ostrom, E (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolu-
tion of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge Univ.
Press).
[7] Hauert, C, De Monte, S, Hofbauer, J, Sigmund, K (2002)
Volunteering as red queen mechanism for cooperation in
public goods games. Science 296:1129–1132.
[8] Hamilton, WD (1975) in Biosocial Anthropology, ed Fox,
R (Wiley, New York), pp 133–155.
[9] Broom, M, Cannings, C, Vickers, G (1997) Multi-player
matrix games. Bull. Math. Biol. 59:931–952.
[10] Hauert, C, Michor, F, Nowak, MA, Doebeli, M (2006)
Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas.
J. Theor. Biol. 239:195–202.
[11] Pacheco, JM, Santos, FC, Souza, MO, Skyrms, B (2009)
Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in n-person stag
hunt dilemmas. Proc. R. Soc. B 276:315–321.
[12] Souza, MO, Pacheco, JM, Santos, FC (2009) Evolution
of cooperation under n-person snowdrift games. J. Theor.
Biol. 260:581–588.
[13] Kurokawa, S, Ihara, Y (2009) Emergence of cooperation in
public goods games. Proc. R. Soc. B 276:1379–1384.
[14] van Veelen, M (2009) Group selection, kin selection, al-
truism and cooperation: when inclusive fitness is right and
when it can be wrong. J. Theor. Biol. 259:589–600.
[15] Nowak, MA, Sasaki, A, Taylor, C, Fudenberg, D (2004)
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite
populations. Nature 428:646–650.
[16] Kandori, M, Mailath, GJ, Rob, R (1993) Learning, muta-
tion, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61:29–
56.
[17] Antal, T, Nowak, MA, Traulsen, A (2009) Strategy abun-
dance in 2x2 games for arbitrary mutation rates. J. Theor.
Biol. 257:340–344.
[18] Fudenberg, D, Nowak, MA, Taylor, C, Imhof, L (2006) Evo-
lutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong
selection and weak mutation. Theor. Pop. Biol. 70:352–363.
[19] Nowak, MA, Sigmund, K (2004) Evolutionary dynamics of
biological games. Science 303:793–799.
[20] Ohtsuki, H, Bordalo, P, Nowak, MA (2007) The one-third
law of evolutionary dynamics. J. Theor. Biol. 249:289–295.
[21] Bomze, I, Pawlowitsch, C (2008) One-third rules with equal-
ity: Second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite
populations. J. Theor. Biol. 254:616–620.
[22] Lessard, S, Ladret, V (2007) The probability of fixation of a
single mutant in an exchangeable selection model. J. Math.
Biol. 54:721–744.
[23] Gordon, HS (1954) The economic theory of a common-
property resource: The fishery. The Journal of Political
Economy 62:124–142.
[24] Hardin, G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science
162:1243–1248.
[25] Hauert, C, Schuster, HG (1997) Effects of increasing the
number of players and memory size in the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma: A numerical approach. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B
264:513–519.
[26] Kollock, P (1998) Social dilemmas: The anatomy of coop-
eration. Annual Review of Sociology 24:183–214.
[27] Rockenbach, B, Milinski, M (2006) The efficient interac-
tion of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature
444:718–723.
[28] Milinski, M, Sommerfeld, RD, Krambeck, HJ, Reed, FA,
Marotzke, J (2008) The collective-risk social dilemma
and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105:2291–2294.
[29] Stander, PE (1992) Cooperative hunting in lions: the role of
the individual. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 29:445–
454.
[30] Hofbauer, J, Sigmund, K (1998) Evolutionary Games and
Population Dynamics (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge).
[31] Traulsen, A, Shoresh, N, Nowak, MA (2008) Analytical
results for individual and group selection of any intensity.
Bull. Math. Biol. 70:1410–1424.
[32] Kerr, B, Riley, MA, Feldman, MW, Bohannan, BJM (2002)
Local dispersal promotes biodiversity in a real-life game of
rock-paper-scissors. Nature 418:171–174.
[33] Czaran, TL, Hoekstra, RF, Pagie, L (2002) Chemical war-
fare between microbes promotes biodiversity. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 99:786–790.
[34] Claussen, JC, Traulsen, A (2008) Cyclic dominance and
biodiversity in well-mixed populations. Phys. Rev. Lett.
100:058104.
[35] Bishop, DT, Cannings, C (1976) Models of animal conflict.
Advances in Applied Probability 8:616–621.
[36] Huang, W, Traulsen, A (2010) Fixation probabilities of
random mutants under frequency dependent selection. J.
Theor. Biol. in press.
[37] Levin, SA, ed (2009) Games, Groups and the Global Good,
Springer Series in Game Theory (Springer).
[38] Broom, M (2003) The use of multiplayer game theory in
the modeling of biological populations. Comments on The-
oretical Biology 8:103–123.
[39] Levin, SA (2000) Multiple scales and the maintenance of
biodiversity. Ecosystems 3:498–506.
[40] Kreps, DM (1990) Game Theory and Economic Mod-
elling (Clarendon Lectures in Economics) (Oxford University
Press, USA).
[41] Damme, EV (1994) Evolutionary game theory. European
Economic Review 38:847–858.
